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Abstract
The idea of the knowledge economy has brought with it a new paradigm of work that 
espouses the professionalization of all work. This new paradigm is now affecting the or-
ganization of work throughout the economy. However, not all work is knowledge work, 
whatever definition is used. The number of “professionals” may rise, but many work-
ers still face rather traditional working conditions. Moreover, we argue, the expected 
growth in the share of knowledge work may be less than expected: along with the forces 
pushing for an increase in knowledge work, there are also forces counteracting these. 
We develop a simple typology of work that takes autonomy and frequency of external 
contacts as dimensions. Workplaces with high autonomy and frequent external contacts 
(with customers and other stakeholders) are considered “paradigmatic” for knowledge 
work. Using data from the European Working Conditions Survey (EWCS), we analyze 
the distribution of the European workforce across different types of work. Analysis of 
EWCS data (1995, 2000, 2005) shows that “paradigmatic” knowledge work is actually 
shrinking. We offer a first, tentative explanation of this remarkable trend.
Zusammenfassung
Die Idee der „Wissensökonomie“ beinhaltet ein neues Paradigma der Professionalisie-
rung von Arbeit, das Einzug in die Organisation der Arbeit der gesamten Wirtschaft 
gehalten hat. Doch nicht jede Arbeit ist Wissensarbeit, wie auch immer man diese defi-
niert. Die Anzahl der „Wissensarbeiter“ mag steigen, doch sehen sich viele Arbeitneh-
mer weiterhin durchaus traditionellen Arbeitsbedingungen gegenüber. Darüber hinaus, 
so die Argumentation der Autoren, kann das erwartete Wachstum des Anteils der Wis-
sensarbeit noch geringer ausfallen als erwartet: Neben Trends, die einen Anstieg der 
Wissensarbeit fördern, gibt es auch solche, die dagegenhalten. Das Papier entwickelt 
eine einfache Typologie wissensbasierter Arbeit, in deren Zentrum die Autonomie der 
Arbeitnehmer und die Häufigkeit externer Kontakte stehen. Arbeitsplätze mit hoher 
Autonomie und häufigen externen Kontakten (mit Kunden und anderen Akteuren) 
werden als „paradigmatisch“ für Wissensarbeit gewertet. Die Verteilung der Arbeits-
kraft in Europa auf verschiedene Beschäftigungstypen wird anhand von Datenmaterial 
des European Working Conditions Survey (EWCS) aus 1995, 2000 und 2005 analysiert. 
Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass „paradigmatische“ Wissensarbeit eher rückläufig ist. Das 
Papier versucht eine erste Erklärung dieser überraschenden Entwicklung.
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Introduction
Knowledge has always been important for the economy, but only recently we have start-
ed talking about the “knowledge economy.” What has happened that makes modern 
economies deserving of this particular epithet? Is there more knowledge around today 
than there was fifty or a hundred years ago? How would we measure this? And how 
would we weigh the relative importance of different pieces of knowledge? Are modern 
economies based on the application of a different kind of knowledge compared to fifty 
years ago? Are they perhaps more science-based? How would we measure that? Is knowl-
edge now playing a different role, one that is somehow more fundamental than in the 
past? What is the opposite of knowledge in this context anyway? Tradition? Instincts? 
Raising these definitional questions opens up a wide range of empirical and ultimately 
historical and philosophical questions. In this paper, we will not deal with these ques-
tions and instead propose a very pragmatic approach. We propose to call an economy a 
knowledge economy if it has the following two characteristics: first, a high proportion 
of the total working population (say, a third) has pursued some form of higher educa-
tion; second, the large majority of the working population (perhaps 75 percent) is not 
working in agriculture or manufacturing. The exact percentages are not so important, 
but just in these two respects modern advanced economies do differ from economies 
of even fifty years ago. The rising levels of education in the working population and 
the rising proportion of service jobs in the labor market are long-term trends. While 
their effects are surfacing only gradually, the introduction of the concept “knowledge 
economy” suggests that somewhere along the way a threshold was crossed, one which 
would justify a different characterization of what the economy is about. Earlier efforts 
to characterize changes in the economy looked at the same trends and introduced con-
cepts like post-industrial economy, service economy, or information economy. We pre-
fer the designation “knowledge economy” over these older ones because it avoids the 
mistaken suggestion that manufacturing (or, for that matter, agriculture) is no longer 
important for the economy, or that the economy can be characterized by the applica-
tion of a single technology. 
In this paper we are interested in the characteristics of work in the knowledge economy. 
The same long-term trends that are behind the emergence of the knowledge society 
have also given rise to a new paradigm, or reference model, of work. In the industrial 
economy, work in the manufacturing industry was the standard of comparison. More 
specifically, the reference model for work during most of the past century was assem-
bly-line work in mass production. All other work would be characterized in terms of its 
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distance from this standard, which scored high on what counted most: productivity. In 
today’s knowledge economy, knowledge work seems to have become such a standard. 
Its defining characteristics are sought in the type of work that was considered “knowl-
edge work” before that expression was ever used: in professional work. The traditional 
characteristics of professional work are becoming the standard against which all other 
work is measured. Even in the traditional manufacturing environment, indeed even on 
the assembly line, workers are invited to behave as professionals, i.e., to bring in their 
expertise, to come up with proposals for improvement, to take responsibility for quality, 
etc. It is in this sense that knowledge work can now be considered paradigmatic.
Reading the managerial literature about trends in job design, work organization and 
human resources, one gets the impression of a general trend towards professionaliza-
tion of work and of work organizations (O’Toole/Lawler 2008; for an early example, 
see Peters 1988). More academic studies of work organization have also frequently em-
phasized the increasing importance of such notions as autonomy, self-regulation, team 
work, customer orientation, continuous improvement, human resource development, 
coaching, and democratic leadership, all of which were absent in the old “Fordist” para-
digm (Appelbaum et al. 2000; Morgan 2006). Obviously, not all work is or will become 
knowledge work, whatever exact definition is used. Nevertheless, it seems to be a wide-
spread assumption that most, if not all, work will move in the direction of the new para-
digm. More than an assumption, it is also an implicit promise made to those who move 
through higher education. It is the official aim now of many EU and OECD countries 
to have 60 percent of every annual cohort leave the full-time education system with at 
least a bachelor’s degree. When these students enter the labor market, they expect to be 
treated as knowledge workers, i.e. as professionals. 
This paper offers some reflections on the assumption of the increasing importance of 
knowledge work in the knowledge economy. We will first argue that there may be forces 
counteracting the trends towards knowledge work. Thus, the share of knowledge work-
ers in the total work force may not be increasing so quickly. In the second part of the 
paper we will present empirical evidence which appears to support our argument. We 
start with a further analysis of the trends that have given rise to the shift in perspective, 
or the new paradigm, usually referred to as the “knowledge economy.” We then describe 
the new paradigm and  offer a simple, pragmatic definition of “knowledge work.” Us-
ing that definition, we present an analysis of data from the European Working Condi-
tions Survey (EWCS), comparing 1995, 2000, and 2005. The analysis seems to confirm 
our expectation that paradigmatic knowledge work has not increased in importance 
in recent years and may even have been shrinking. We conclude with a discussion of 
the implications of our findings, some qualifying observations, and some pointers for 
further research. 
Dankbaar, Vissers: Of Knowledge and Work 7
Four trends in developed economies
The rise of a new paradigm of work reflects fundamental changes in the dynamics of 
capitalist economies. Just as the picture of the worker at the assembly line emerged in 
conjunction with the rise of systems of mass production, now a picture of the new pro-
fessional is developing in conjunction with new patterns of economic activity. In this 
section, we will sketch out some underlying trends that directly pertain to the place of 
work in the economic system.
The rising level of education
The average level of education of the working population in developed capitalist coun-
tries has risen constantly in the past two centuries and is still rising today. This trend 
can be explained only partially, if at all, by the higher qualifications that employees 
must possess. An effect in the opposite direction is more likely: that the large supply of 
highly qualified workers has made it possible to design work structures that place higher 
demands on workers. Such structures are not only installed for the purpose of utilizing 
employee capabilities, they also help to meet the work-related demands and expecta-
tions of people who have invested much in their education. Thus higher education 
levels create permanent pressure to develop new conceptions of work, such as the one 
mentioned above. Empirical research shows that required job qualifications are indeed 
increasing, albeit not enough to match the rise of the average level of education of the 
working population (Asselberghs et al. 1998). The result is that workers’ capabilities 
are only partially used. However, it should be added that claims about workers’ rising 
qualifications are largely based on statistics such as “average duration of education” or 
“spread of the population over different types (and different levels) of schools.” The 
assumption, usually unexpressed, is that the same type of school or the same duration 
of education would provide the same qualification today as in the past. Only if this as-
sumption is valid can we conclude that an increasing number of years in school, or a ris-
ing percentage of the population attaining a higher level of education, results in higher 
levels of qualification. But how valid is this assumption? 
If we want to elucidate the relationship between schooling and skills there are few em-
pirical studies to rely upon, since skills are usually measured by proxy: as applicants’ 
education levels or the qualifications they hold (McIntosh/Vignoles 2001), or as edu-
cational attainment, employment experience, or the type of work undertaken (Kelly/
Lewis 2003). The result of such indirect measurement is that evidence is lacking about 
the relationship between skills and any of the proxies mentioned, which may explain 
(at least in part) the simultaneous presence of two strands of research that are hard to 
reconcile. The first focuses on school quality and the quality of teachers, emphasizing 
the economic necessity of improving these (Hanushek 2003; Handel 2003; Hanushek/
Woessmann 2008). The other concentrates on the economic costs of overeducation 
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(McGuinness 2006; Verhaest/Omey 2006), arguing that overeducation lowers job satis-
faction, which in turn hampers productivity. Many education practitioners support the 
first line of reasoning, insisting that school quality is declining and that today more 
years in school are necessary to attain a given skill level than before, or the same number 
of years in a higher-level school. The claim is serious, since skill levels are now more 
dependent on school quality than they were in the past, when workers acquired much 
of their knowledge and skills in practice. 
However, disputes about school quality, teacher quality, over- and undereducation, skills 
mismatch in the labor market, or the school-to-work transition are all about issues of 
alignment between education and work, and take a high and increasing average level of 
education for granted. It is beyond discussion, in developed countries, that an elaborate 
education system exists, that school attendance rates are high, and that the changing 
nature of work requires an increasingly well-educated working population.
The growth of services
A second trend is the changing structure of employment (Singelmann/Browning 1980; 
Aoyama/Castells 2002). Presently, in developed countries only a small part of the work-
ing population is employed in the manufacturing industry – and of those employed 
there, only a minority are directly involved in actual production. In addition, the contri-
bution of agriculture, or of the primary sector in general, to total employment has be-
come very small (Feinstein 1999), even in countries with large agricultural exports, such 
as the Netherlands or the United States. The vast majority of the people are employed in 
services, whether public or private, and this share is still growing (Wölfl 2004).
To some extent, this trend reflects the outsourcing of service activities by manufacturing 
companies. Work that is now conducted by independent service-providing firms used 
to be done by industrial firms themselves. In other words, work once registered in of-
ficial statistics as manufacturing is now registered as service (Schettkat/Yocarini 2006). 
The change is not merely administrative, however. In traditional manufacturing com-
panies, the departments providing services were seen as appendages to the main activity, 
which was manufacturing. In an independent service firm, in contrast, the provision of 
services is the main activity, no longer hampered by a lack of priority. This leads to a 
subtle shift in the priorities guiding the organization of work: away from an overriding 
attention to efficiency, and toward a focus on close interaction with customers that is 
so characteristic of the service industry (Frenkel 2000; Peneder/Kaniovski/Dachs 2003; 
Edvardsson/Gustavsson 2003). The “culture of service” is then markedly separate from 
the “culture of manufacturing.” Service delivery requires different qualifications, a dif-
ferent attitude, and different codes of conduct from industrial production. 
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Having said this, we should note that manufacturing has started to emulate the culture 
of services. Quality systems are being installed that aim to bring customer demands into 
the structure and perhaps even into the awareness of manufacturing units. Concepts 
like “lean thinking” (Womack/Jones 2003) and “mini-companies” (De Leede/Looise 
1999; Suzaki 2002) emphasize the need for all workers to concentrate on the needs of 
customers – be they inside or outside the company. Besides, many industrial firms have 
discovered that it is beneficial to define their products in terms of the service delivered 
to their customers. More often than not, this helps a firm to recognize services that are 
complementary to a tangible product and that can be sold, sometimes very profitably, 
in combination with this product.
Various explanations of the growing share of services in the employment structure have 
been proposed, including the outsourcing of service functions by industrial firms; a 
lower growth of productivity in services than in manufacturing; the internationaliza-
tion of service activities as a result of loosened trade restrictions; the greater complexity 
of corporate activities, which necessitates more service inputs; the so-called Engels ef-
fect, meaning that the growing wealth of end consumers leads to increasing demands 
for services; and the creation of new service sector activities, such as online information 
services (Button/Pentecost 1993: 626). But “isolating the impact of each has proved 
elusive” (ibid). Various circumstances contribute to this problem: the simultaneous oc-
currence of the factors mentioned; the heterogeneity of services and variations between 
sectors, regions, and countries (Bernard/Jones 1996; Inklaar/Timmer/van Ark 2007); 
difficulties of actually measuring the growth of services and manufacturing (Schettkat/
Yocarini 2006); and indirect effects of service productivity that must be taken into ac-
count (Maroto/Rubalcaba 2008).
For present purposes, a detailed explanation of the growth of the service sector is not 
necessary. The important thing is that the factors mentioned above not only involve is-
sues of registration, but also imply a recognition of actual changes in the employment 
structure. In the words of Schettkat and Yocarini (2006), “the shift to services is real.” 
The point is that the consumption of services is less constrained by physical limitations 
than is the consumption of products from the primary or secondary sector. It is pos-
sible, then, to speak of a tertiarization (Peneder/Kaniovski/Dachs 2003) of the advanced 
economies, a process closely related to two further trends in contemporary capitalism: 
globalization and automation.
Automation and ICT
Tertiarization of the economy is not possible without the ongoing increase of labor 
productivity in manufacturing. Over the years mechanization, automation, and related 
organizational changes have constantly reduced the amount of labor per unit of prod-
uct. At present, only a fraction of the retail price of consumption goods relates to actual 
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production costs, and the wages of production workers represent an even smaller frac-
tion. A significant share of retail prices goes to product development, design, distribu-
tion, and marketing costs. The volumes of production (and consumption) of industrial 
goods have risen over the years, but not enough to keep up with productivity growth. 
The result is less manufacturing employment in general, and less employment in direct 
production in particular. The work that is still necessary in highly automated manu-
facturing processes usually requires higher skills and a deeper understanding of the 
processes than was needed before automation. The use of information technology has 
also allowed for a higher variety of products and greater flexibility of processes, making 
small-batch production economically more feasible. Work on such processes requires 
workers with greater “intellective skills” who are able to operate the new machinery 
(Vallas/Beck 1996: 341).
Productivity increases have been smaller in the service industry than in manufactur-
ing, but here too the effects of automation and information and communications tech-
nologies (ICT) are noticeable. However, considerable differences exist between types of 
services (for a classification, see Browning/Singelmann 1976; Castells/Aoyama 1994). 
In personal services such as hairdressing, for instance, automation is difficult to accom-
plish, both technically and because it may not be appreciated by customers. But in other 
service sectors automation has become quite important, especially where a distinction 
between front office and back office work has been made. The front office is where ac-
tivities take place that require customer contact, while supporting and administrative 
processes are carried out in the back office, away from customers (Zomerdijk/De Vries 
2007: 110). The productivity of back-office work has particularly increased, largely be-
cause of the use of information technology. In finance, for instance, the present volumes 
and speeds of payments would not have been possible with the technologies that were 
in use a few decades ago. Indeed, the impact of ICT on service work has been so great 
that we may refer to the economic and technological transformation that followed as 
the first “post-industrial” revolution (distinguishing it from the First Industrial Revo-
lution of the late eighteenth century and the Second Industrial Revolution of the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, both of which mainly affected the nature of 
manufacturing work [Dankbaar 2000]). 
Globalization and the relocation of work
Services are produced in close interaction with customers. This is why it is often dif-
ficult to bring the production of services abroad, a limitation that does not apply to the 
manufacturing of tangible goods. In recent years, the manufacturing of many indus-
trial products, or of parts and components, has been relocated to countries with rela-
tively low wages. Only sectors with very high levels of automation (especially process 
industries) have been relatively immune to relocation, because the wage costs in these 
largely automated sectors have become almost negligible. Such “offshoring” initially in-
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volved mainly production processes requiring relatively low skills, but nowadays this 
restriction no longer applies. The working population in many low-wage countries has 
a level of education that is high enough to allow for the use of advanced production 
techniques. For instance, the same robots can be found in the body shops of car plants 
in Eastern Europe or China as in West European or North American car plants. These 
robots are used in the offshore facilities to ensure the required levels of quality for ex-
port markets. Where quality is comparable, relocation decisions will be based on wage 
and productivity differences and on transportation costs. Thus, part of the tertiariza-
tion of Western economies is a result of relocation of production. Routine work that 
requires few worker qualifications is either almost completely automated or brought 
to countries with lower wages (Vosse 1999). As a consequence, the idea of industry as 
mass production and mass assembly with a large share of manual work – arguably the 
dominant model for the organization of work in the twentieth century – has almost 
ceased to exist in Western countries. In some industries, such as the clothing indus-
try, nearly all production has been relocated to low-wage countries. In other industries, 
such as car manufacturing, large parts of the production of parts and components have 
been relocated to low-wage countries, but not final assembly. Location decisions in an 
important industry such as the automobile industry are based on sociopolitical as well 
as economic grounds.
A new paradigm
The long-term result of the trends discussed above is the knowledge economy, where 
a large and increasing percentage of school leavers has completed higher education 
and in which the “culture of service” has become dominant. Work has changed as a 
consequence, and the thinking about what constitutes “normal” work has changed as 
well. For many decades, normal work was work on the assembly line: machine-paced, 
repetitive, and isolated. Sometimes workers were even forbidden to speak with one 
another during work. Throughout much of the twentieth century, the assembly-line 
model symbolized progress and inspired thinking about work organization in many 
branches of the economy, and not just in manufacturing (e.g., in administrative organi-
zation as well). Today the assembly-line model is no longer the prevailing one, not even 
in the sectors it used to dominate, and a paradigm of “knowledge work” has arisen that 
is in many respects the opposite of the assembly-line work paradigm. Key concepts de-
scribing knowledge work are autonomy and customer orientation. Both of them derive 
from the world of professions and services and are now considered normal and indeed 
normative characteristics of work. Even in the manufacturing environment and on the 
assembly line, job design is now phrased in terms of autonomy (self-regulation) and 
customer orientation. 
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The new paradigm has been particularly inspired by knowledge-intensive services (Scott 
1998; Burton-Jones 1999), and by consulting firms in particular. Consulting firms are 
“in many ways emblematic of knowledge organizations” (Bergström/Hasselblad/Kärre-
man 2009: 180), and “consultancy is typically classified as knowledge work” (Donnolly 
2006: 79). Indeed, at times it seems as if advocates of the new paradigm rely on their 
own management consulting practices when outlining the trends and sketching the 
needs of today’s business firms (for an early and influential example, see Peters 1988). 
Consultants act in close interaction with their customers. They apply their knowledge 
to the problems of a particular customer, and even though the methods they use may 
be more or less standardized, the uniqueness of each customer will necessitate local ad-
aptations and creative thinking. In this respect, consultants usually have a large measure 
of autonomy in the way they perform their tasks. Accordingly, autonomy and external 
contacts, particularly with customers, can be viewed as features of paradigmatic knowl-
edge work. If indeed the economy is developing into a knowledge economy, the propor-
tion of jobs displaying these features can be expected to increase.
In this paper we argue that this claim must be taken broadly. The knowledge work 
paradigm implies that the share of jobs involving autonomy and external contacts will 
increase as an economy becomes more knowledge-intensive. This applies to knowledge 
work as the term is commonly understood, referring to workers who have a high level 
of education and, very importantly, who own the means of production in a knowledge-
based organization (Drucker 1993, quoted by Blackler 1995: 1027) – and it also applies to 
other work (“non-knowledge work”). Not only is the proportion of knowledge workers 
larger in a knowledge economy than in the economy that preceded it (often industrial), 
but the knowledge requirements to be met by other, non-knowledge workers are larger 
as well. Increasingly, workers in other economic sectors (including manufacturing) are 
supposed to behave as consultants, at least part of the time. In addition to performing 
their regular tasks, in the execution of which they may already enjoy considerable au-
tonomy, they are expected to contribute to the improvement of organizational routines, 
consulting other stakeholders inside and outside their workplace and using the insights 
thus obtained to propose improvements in existing products and processes.
Thus, not all work characterized by high levels of autonomy and external contacts quali-
fies as knowledge work as it is commonly understood, but autonomy and external con-
tacts are nonetheless features of work that meets the knowledge work paradigm. A study 
of the development of work in an economy that is moving towards greater knowledge 
intensity cannot be restricted to “knowledge workers” and leave other worker catego-
ries undiscussed. Besides, it must be noted that the concepts of “knowledge workers” 
and “knowledge-intensive firms” are not well-defined (Alvesson 2001; Donnolly 2006). 
Presently, “knowledge work” tends to be associated with non-routine tasks that have to 
be performed. Warhurst and Thompson (2006: 787) define it as work that “draws on a 
body of theoretical (specialized and abstract) knowledge that is utilized, under condi-
tions of comparative autonomy, to innovate products and processes.” And Gargiulo, 
Ertug and Galunic (2009) speak of knowledge workers as those who “create value by ac-
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quiring, processing, and providing information to create solutions and address complex 
problems.” This definition is simple, in that it selects only one of the dimensions that 
might be used to define knowledge workers, yet it does not allow for a clear distinction 
between those who are and those who are not knowledge workers. For that, terms like 
“information” and “complex problems” are not clear enough themselves.
In addition, it must be noted that work according to the knowledge work paradigm is 
not only defined by level of knowledge and kind of task, but also by values and attitudes. 
Characteristic attributes of knowledge work are responsibility, commitment, initiative, 
creativity, independent judgment, communicative skills, and discretion, all of which 
reflect traditional professional values. Consultants and representatives of other “new 
professions” attempt to mimic established professions by emphasizing the values that 
formerly distinguished these – a few groups occupying privileged, high-status posi-
tions in sectors like health and law – from other fields of occupation. Although the 
established professions were defined in terms of the mastery of a specific domain of 
knowledge, their special status was no less related to their ability to define and maintain 
ethical standards of work. 
The comparison of knowledge work with established professions is frequently made 
(Reed 1996; Scarbrough 1999; Alvesson 2001; May/Korczynski/Frenkel 2002; Evetts 
2003; Donelly 2006; Hwang/Powell 2009). Typically, the established professions are seen 
as either constituting one of the categories of knowledge workers or as a related catego-
ry that distinguishes itself from other knowledge-intensive work categories because of 
its officially recognized practices. In both cases, it is possible to compare the established 
professions with other categories of knowledge-intensive work – a comparison that 
leads to some noticeable observations: knowledge-based occupations are expanding 
employment categories, while professions, as a category, are experiencing “a reduction 
in autonomy” or “a weakening of their abilities to act as self-regulating occupational 
groups” (Evetts 2003: 396). Hwang and Powell (2009: 268) speak of a professionalism 
paradox: “The apparent decline in the influence of traditional professions such as law, 
medicine, and divinity has been accompanied by a general amplification of profession-
alism or the “professionalization of everyone.”  
Counteracting tendencies
Autonomy at work is an intricate concept, and its implications have long been a subject 
of debate among students of work organization (Smith 1997). In this paper we will 
not discuss the possible benefits or drawbacks of an increase in autonomy and external 
contacts. Instead we observe that, despite the new paradigm’s focus on professional 
work, in practice autonomy and external contacts continue to be limited or nonexistent 
in many workplaces (May/Korczynski/Frenkel 2002). First, traditional jobs with low 
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autonomy and few external contacts are still widely present, not just – and perhaps even 
less frequently – in manufacturing, but also in services. Second, autonomy and frequent 
external contacts are independent characteristics in the sense that one does not presup-
pose the other, as Figure 1 illustrates.
Contacts with customers are very frequent in fast-food companies or in call centers, but 
work processes in such organizations are highly standardized, with low autonomy as a 
consequence. On the other hand, there are jobs that combine high work autonomy with 
sparse customer contacts, for instance in industrial laboratories. 
Discussions of the new services-inspired paradigm tend to pay little attention to the fact 
that jobs without high work autonomy or without frequent external contacts are still 
widespread. This lack of attention is unfortunate. Advocates of the new paradigm may 
claim that we are in a transitional stage, and that in due course all jobs will be redefined 
in ways that meet the professional service model, but even if this claim is valid (which 
cannot be verified), slight attention to “old” forms of work means little support for at-
tempts to facilitate the transition from old to new work organizations. But it is also pos-
sible that the claim is simply invalid, and that the process toward a new, services-derived 
organization of work will be less comprehensive, less linear, less irreversible than advo-
cates of the new paradigm tend to think, and less quickly progressing. 
One reason to treat the “transition” claim cautiously is that the history of work organi-
zation gives little ground to believe in unambiguous and uninterrupted processes in a 
single direction (Parks 1995). But there is a second reason, deriving from Braverman’s 
Figure 1 Work autonomy and customer contacts
Few customer 
contacts
Many customer 
contacts
Low work 
autonomy
Worker in a traditional 
factory
Worker in a fast-food 
restaurant
High work 
autonomy
Laboratory researcher Consultant
Arrows show tendencies in the nature of work as a society moves 
from an industrial to a knowledge economy.
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work (Braverman 1974) and the debate it provoked. Braverman argued that under con-
ditions of capitalist production, the pressures of competition would force employers 
to engage in constant rationalization and to take control of work processes for that 
purpose, which would include the transfer of production knowledge from workers to 
managers. The rationalization of work would be made possible, or at least facilitated, by 
organizational concepts such as Taylorism and Fordism and by new technology. By in-
creasing control, management would be able to improve productivity. The result would 
be “deskilling,” as workers’ skills and their abilities to exercise independent judgment 
became obsolete and were replaced by standardized routines, defined by engineers, that 
could be executed by less skilled workers.
Braverman’s theory has inspired a wide-ranging debate about the nature of work and 
future directions of work organization (Dankbaar 2004; Adler 2007), but in recent years 
his argument has been losing momentum. Thompson (2007) ascribes this loss of mo-
mentum to a change of perspective in social science, away from realism and materialism, 
and insists that it has “little to do with the validity of its [Braverman’s theory’s] empiri-
cal propositions, whether about skill formation or anything else.” This claim seems too 
strong, as research into deskilling has been inconclusive thus far. Some authors report 
evidence of deskilling, others of upskilling (or upgrading, in Adler’s vocabulary), and 
still others report evidence of both occurring at the same time (Burris 1998: 142; Lewis 
2007: 402–403).
Skilled work is not the same as knowledge work, and the two must not be conflated, 
but reference to the deskilling debate is relevant here. Empirically speaking, the point is 
that no clear case can be made for either deskilling or upskilling. Those supporting the 
upskilling hypothesis should be most concerned about this. In an age of automation, 
when much routine work is taken over by machines, less-skilled workers are more likely 
to be laid off – in which case they will no longer appear in labor force statistics, which 
consequently should show clear trends of upskilling. The relation to the knowledge 
economy thesis is that even the “transition claim” does not allow for such uncertainty 
about developments in the nature of work. Theoretically, the deskilling debate reminds 
us of the fact that work, whether assembly-line work or paradigmatic knowledge work, 
is still – and in the case of established professions even increasingly – embedded in 
corporations that are subject to market requirements such as productivity, profitabil-
ity, and efficiency. These market requirements drive executives and managers towards 
efforts to control workers and to implement performance schemes. Such efforts will 
reduce work autonomy for knowledge workers and other workers alike.
And indeed, modern knowledge work organizations show signals of management tak-
ing control (Bergström/Hasselblad/Kärreman 2009). In hospitals and in universities, in 
consulting firms and in financial companies: in all of these places, work is subjected to 
systems of performance measurement, quality control and an ensuing standardization 
of work procedures and methods, all of which were virtually absent only twenty-five 
years ago. There is considerable debate about the effectiveness of these managerial in-
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struments in raising the efficiency and quality of performance, but the sheer size of 
many organizations seems to make these measures necessary. The risk of shirking by less 
motivated workers makes a reduction in autonomy almost inevitable, but so does the 
desire of workers to be treated equitably and according to their individual performance. 
In this context, it is also necessary to point to knowledge management as a managerial 
strategy that affects the autonomy of knowledge workers. Knowledge management is 
not immediately concerned with controlling workers, but it is concerned with control-
ling their knowledge, in the sense that an important aim of knowledge management is 
to make a company less dependent on individual persons possessing particular pieces 
of knowledge. There are clear parallels with Braverman’s analysis of workers’ manufac-
turing knowledge being analyzed and translated by industrial engineers into standard 
operating procedures. Increasingly, knowledge workers are confronted with “evidence-
based” expert systems, supporting and more often than not instructing them in their 
work. If they want to use their own judgment and depart from the advice given by the 
system, they do so at their own risk. 
With regard to that other defining characteristic of knowledge work, external contacts, 
especially with customers, it is also possible to point to some counteracting tendencies 
that may limit the rise of true knowledge work. Starting with the large service orga-
nizations in the financial sector, we see that machines have been inserted between the 
representatives of the organizations and the customers. Many customers only relate to 
their banks through ATMs and the Internet. And if they pick up the phone with some 
particular question, they are guided through a whole system of options before ending 
at a real person (if they are lucky), who is likely to read a pre-formulated answer to their 
question from a computer screen. That real person may not be at the location that the 
customer thinks they are calling into, and could be all the way on the other side of the 
globe. Information and communications technology allow for largely standardized and 
rationalized customer service systems, which reduce actual communication between 
members of the organization and customers to a minimum. 
More generally, mechanization and automation in services frequently take the form of 
self-service (Gershuny 1978). In some cases, the service can be taken over by the cus-
tomer almost completely. Examples date from even before the IT revolution. The self-
service supermarket did not involve any mechanization or automation when it was in-
troduced. With no more than a reorganization of the shop, contacts with the customer 
were reduced to a routine at the cash register. Personal advice from grocers was replaced 
by glossy circulars with recipes and tips. Today new technologies allow customers to 
self-scan their items, eliminating even the personal contact at the exit. Expert systems, 
thus far mainly in use to support knowledge workers at work, are increasingly used to 
support self-service by customers as well, even in such unexpected areas as medical 
diagnosis. 
To summarize, we have observed various trends pushing for an increase in knowledge 
work, which is giving rise to a new paradigm of work that is largely inspired by profes-
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sional services, but we have also observed some counteracting tendencies that are likely 
to limit the rise of workplaces in which high autonomy and frequent external contacts 
are combined. Most knowledge work takes place in companies that operate in a highly 
competitive environment in which management tries to raise levels of efficiency by 
setting performance standards, quality standards, and sometimes even behavioral stan-
dards. The predominant approach in the literature on work and work organization is to 
emphasize the first development, while disregarding the second. In the next section, we 
will test the claim, inherent in the new work paradigm, that knowledge work is steadily 
increasing in advanced economies, and we will look for evidence in support of our 
own assumption that, as a corollary to the spread of the new paradigm, the activities of 
knowledge workers are increasingly subjected to automation and managerial control, 
with a consequent loss in autonomy and customer contacts. 
Empirical analysis
For our empirical analysis, we drew upon the 1995, 2000, and 2005 European Working 
Conditions Surveys (EWCS). The EWCS are conducted by the European Foundation 
for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions, a European Union body in-
stalled by the European Council in 1975 and charged with the task of contributing to 
the planning and design of living and working conditions in Europe.1 Thus far, four 
surveys have been conducted, of which the surveys used in this study are the most re-
cent (the first survey was in 1991).2 
The three surveys are not identical. First, questions in the 2005 survey are more numer-
ous and sometimes more detailed than in the previous surveys. Second, the number of 
countries involved has increased in a way that reflects the enlargement of the European 
Union. The 1995 and 2000 surveys were administered in fifteen Member States, the 
2005 survey in thirty-one states – including not only the new Member States but also 
the (then-) projected Member States of Romania and Bulgaria, as well as Norway, Swit-
zerland, Croatia, and Turkey. For reasons of comparison, the present study confines 
itself to the fifteen states present in the 1995 and 2000 surveys. A third difference is that 
the 1995 and 2000 surveys were proportional, including more respondents from large 
countries (Germany, France, United Kingdom) than from smaller countries (Nether-
lands, Belgium, Denmark). In the 2005 survey, each country contributed more or less 
the same number of respondents, approximately 1000 per country.
1 <www.eurofound.europa.eu/about/index.htm>
2 Survey data can be obtained from the Economic and Social Data Service (ESDS), hosted by the 
University of Essex <www.esds.ac.uk>.
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In the present study, the only respondents included are those who claimed to be “self-
employed without employees,” “self-employed with employees,” or “employed” (values 
1–3 on item q3a in all three surveys). This left us with the following respondent num-
bers for the three surveys: 15,240 (1995), 20,825 (2000), and 14,307 (2005).
Developments in the proportion of knowledge work
As described earlier, frequent external contacts and autonomy at work are considered 
paradigmatic elements of work in the knowledge economy. We refer to work showing 
these characteristics as “knowledge work.” We used the question “Does your main paid 
job involve dealing directly with people who are not employees at your workplace?” to 
indicate “frequency of external contacts.” This question (item q11j in all three surveys) 
was measured on a seven-point scale ranging from “all of the time” to “never.” In the 
2005 survey, the values 1 and 2 (“all of the time” and “almost all of the time”) accounted 
for about 50 percent of the answers. We took these “1” and “2” values to indicate “many 
external contacts,” not only for the 2005 survey but also for the earlier surveys. Work 
autonomy, our second dimension of knowledge work, was calculated from three ques-
tions: “Are you able to choose or change your order of tasks?”; “Are you able to choose 
or change your methods of work?”; and “Are you able to choose or change your speed 
or rate of work?” (item q24a–c in all three surveys). The choices for these items were bi-
nary; respondents could answer “yes” or “no.” Assuming that autonomy at work would 
require each of these questions to be answered in the affirmative, we created a compos-
ite item “autonomy” that is “high” if a respondent answered “yes” to all three questions, 
and “low” in other cases. Table 1 presents the results of cross-tabulating these two di-
mensions for each of the three surveys.
The figures in Table 1 are remarkable. Between 1995 and 2005, the proportion of “knowl-
edge work” became smaller. The decrease is sharpest in the high autonomy/many exter-
nal contacts category between 1995 and 2000, followed by a modest increase between 
2000 and 2005. This finding refutes the assumption underlying the new paradigm of 
work: that the proportion of knowledge workers is increasing.
It is possible that the pattern in Table 1 is a result of too stringent a criterion for “many 
external contacts,” because for respondents the difference may have been small between 
Table 1 Combinations of autonomy and external contacts
High autonomy/ 
many external contacts
High autonomy/ 
few external contacts
Low autonomy/ 
many external contacts
Low autonomy/ 
few external contacts
1995 30.2% 25.7% 20.9% 23.1%
2000 24.7% 28.4% 19.2% 27.7%
2005 25.6% 28.2% 20.8% 25.4%
Source: EWCS (1995, 2000, 2005).
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“almost all of the time” and “around 3/4 of the time,” the next value of item q11j.3 In Ta-
ble 2, we inspect this possibility by presenting percentages in the high autonomy/many 
external contacts column after relaxing the criterion for “many external contacts.” It is 
obvious that relaxing the criterion for “many external contacts” enlarges the number of 
respondents who meet the criterion, so percentages in the left column of Table 1 would 
have been higher had we used a less stringent criterion. The percentages in the left col-
umn of Table 1 therefore have comparative value, and should not be taken as absolute 
values of the proportion of knowledge workers. 
Comparing the percentages in the three surveys, we find that relaxing the criterion for 
“many external contacts” does not change the observation of a sharp decrease in the 
share of “knowledge work” (the high autonomy/many external contacts category) be-
tween 1995 and 2000, and a modest increase between 2000 and 2005. In subsequent 
analyses, we will use the stringent criterion. 
The analysis thus far has tested the claim that knowledge work is increasing, which is a 
cornerstone of the new paradigm of work. In the previous section, we presented some 
counteracting tendencies that were likely to limit the number of workplaces character-
ized by high levels of autonomy and external contacts. We still expected a slow rise in 
the share of “knowledge work,” but we were wrong. The proportion of knowledge work, 
as measured by autonomy and external contacts, is actually decreasing.
Changes in the nature of knowledge work
The advent of the knowledge economy has not reduced the pressures of competition 
and the related need for efficiency and profitability. On the contrary, it seems to have 
added strong external demands concerning the quality (in various aspects) of goods 
and services delivered. An obvious instrument to make sure that such external demands 
3 Values for variables q11j (“Does your main paid job involve dealing directly with people who are 
not employees at your workplace?”): 1 “All of the time”; 2 “Almost all of the time”; 3 “Around 
3/4 of the time”; 4 “Around half of the time”; 5 “Around 1/4 of the time”; 6 “Almost never”; 7 
“Never”; 8 “Don’t know/no opinion”; 9 “Refusal.”
Table 2 Percentages in the high autonomy/many external contacts column under different 
 criteria for many external contacts
Stringent
(almost all of  
the time or more)
Intermediate
(around 3/4 of  
the time or more)
Relaxed
(around half of  
the time or more)
1995 30.2% 32.7% 37.0%
2000 24.7% 27.2% 31.2%
2005 25.6% 28.4% 32.5%
Source: EWCS (1995, 2000, 2005).
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are met is the use of output standards, an instrument that calls for higher levels of man-
agement control. We presume that knowledge work is increasingly being brought under 
such control, especially when knowledge work is growing (or is believed to be growing) 
to be a significant proportion of the total amount of work in an organization. In this 
section we test the proposition that the more that knowledge work becomes part of a 
firm’s normal production processes, the more knowledge workers will be subjected to a 
high degree of management control.
Some of the items covering aspects of work in the EWCS surveys can be used to create 
a tentative measure of the degree of management control. This measure is based on two 
items: q21c (“Is your pace of work dependent on numerical production targets or per-
formance targets?”) and q21e (“Is your pace of work dependent on the direct control of 
your boss?”). Both items are binary; respondents could choose between “yes” and “no.” 
We took a “no” answer on both items as indicating a low degree of management control. 
Although the measure pertains to “pace of work,” and not output of work, it is still a 
more direct indicator of “management control” than autonomy – because a “yes” on 
the autonomy questions (e.g. “Are you able to choose or change your order of tasks?”) 
does not necessarily mean that control is absent. These two variables, control and au-
tonomy, might be closely related, reflecting the classic tension in organizations that 
more control means less autonomy (Feldman 1989; Scarbrough 1999; May/Korczyn-
ski/Frenkel 2002; Robertson/Swan 2003). However, this may not be how respondents 
understood the questions underlying management control. Table 3 shows a modestly 
strong but statistically significant relationship between “autonomy” and “management 
control” (χ2 statistic in Table 3, all years p < .000). The relationship is in the expected 
direction: in all three surveys, most respondents under conditions of low management 
control report high autonomy and most respondents under conditions of high man-
agement control report low autonomy. But clearly, the relationship is not perfect. Two 
groups do not fit in with the classic tension between autonomy and control. Those in 
the group that reports low autonomy under conditions of low management control 
may have experienced forms of control that do not, or not directly, stem from manage-
ment. Examples are organizational culture (Robertson/Swan 2003) and peer pressure 
(Landsbergis/Cahill/Schnall 1999; Morrell/Wilkinson 2002). There is also a group, and 
not a tiny one, of respondents who report high autonomy under conditions of high 
management control. People in this group are saying: my pace of work is dependent 
on numerical production targets or performance targets, and the pace of my work is 
dependent on the direct control of my boss, and yet I am able to choose or change the 
order of my tasks, my work methods, and the speed or rate of my work. They are saying: 
yes, there is management control, but not enough to curb me.
We used the “management control” measure to examine the degree of management 
control exerted over knowledge workers (and other workers) in sectors (or sector cate-
gories) with varying degrees of knowledge intensity.
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The EWCS surveys do not provide firm-level information on knowledge intensity, but 
they do provide information about the sector of the company in which a respondent 
is working. In the surveys, measurement of economic sectors is based on NACE, the 
industrial classification of economic activities within the European Union. The 1995 
survey includes the main sections of NACE Rev. 1 4 (Eurostat 1996), while categories in 
the 2000 and 2005 surveys are more detailed. 
To make the surveys comparable, we converted values in the 2000 and 2005 surveys to 
the NACE main sections as present in the 1995 survey. These are the sections in Table 4. 
This table presents the percentage of participants possessing “higher education” as an 
estimate of a sector’s knowledge intensity. For 2005, a percentage of people with higher 
education per sector is given that denotes ISCED levels 4–6 (post-secondary non-tertia-
ry education or tertiary education). ISCED is UNESCO’s International Standard Classi-
fication of Education.5 No ISCED item was included in the earlier surveys, but the 1995 
survey contains the item, “How old were you when you stopped full-time education?” 
We take the value “20+ years” (the highest value for this item) to indicate higher educa-
tion. The 2000 survey does not contain items pertaining to education level. Because of 
the different indicators for 1995 and 2005, education rank numbers are added. 
The education rank of sectors is comparable between 1995 and 2005, but not identical. 
On the basis of data available in EWCS surveys, it is not possible to check if these dif-
ferences must be ascribed to different questions used to collect education level data, or 
to actual changes in the percentage of highly educated workers in the sectors. Generally 
speaking, however, the same sectors are scoring high in both years, and the same sectors 
are scoring low. We use this outcome as an empirical criterion for defining sector cat-
egories of knowledge intensity: “High”, “Intermediate”, and “Low” (indicated by the let-
ters in brackets in Table 4). The sector of public administration is not included. While 
we do recognize that public administration in many countries has been reformed in 
4 In the 1995 survey, some main NACE sections were taken together. Fishing (B) was added to 
Agriculture, Hunting and Forestry (A). Mining and Quarrying (C) was added to Manufactur-
ing (D). Education (M), Health and Social Work (N), Other Community, Social and Personal 
service activities (O), Private Households with Employed Persons (P), and Extra-territorial Or-
ganizations and Bodies (Q) were combined in the category “Other Services.”
 <www.eurofound.europa.eu/ewco/surveys/previoussurveys/surveys91–96.htm>
5 <www-uis.unesco.org/TEMPLATE/pdf/isced/ISCED_A.pdf >
Table 3 Percentages of degree of management control and autonomy, and chi square
 statistic (Pearson)
Low degree of management control High degree of management control
High autonomy Low autonomy High autonomy Low autonomy
1995 (χ2 486.5) 30.6 16.1 25.2 28.1
2000 (χ2 531.6) 31.5 20.3 21.6 26.7
2005 (χ2 151.6) 26.5 17.8 27.5 28.2
Source: EWCS (1995, 2000, 2005); percentages per survey.
22 MPIfG Working Paper 09/16
recent decades under the banner of “new public management,” and principles derived 
from private sectors – accountability, customer orientation, decentralization – were ad-
opted (Hood 1995; Page 2005) to improve performance, no public administration is 
facing the kind of competition that private firms have to deal with. We can therefore 
expect different work regimes, and for this reason left public administration out of the 
sector categories of knowledge intensity.
In Table 5, sector knowledge intensity and knowledge work (measured as high auton-
omy and many external contacts, see Table 1) are combined with data on management 
control. The cells in the table display the percentage of respondents who indicated high 
levels of management control in the three survey years. Thus the table shows the rela-
tion between the knowledge intensity of a sector and the degree of management control 
for the two categories of work: knowledge work and “other” work. It also allows for 
comparisons between the years of the surveys. The “new paradigm” assumption would 
be that management control will be lower in knowledge work than in other work, and 
lower in sectors with high knowledge intensity than in sectors with low knowledge 
intensity, and that the percentage of respondents indicating high management control 
would diminish over time.
The low percentages of high management control in 2000 are noticeable, especially for 
knowledge work in the high and intermediate knowledge intensity sector categories. In 
every cell, the 2000 percentages are lower than those for 1995 and 2005. It is tempting to 
think of a business cycle effect here. The 2000 survey period of field work was between 
March 1 and April 30, 2000,6 coinciding with the Wall Street dot-com crash. Presum-
ably, the respondents’ views on work would have been affected by the previous period 
of strong economic expansion and tight labor markets, since such conditions are gener-
ally seen as strengthening the position of workers against efforts to exert hierarchical 
control. 
6 <www.eurofound.europa.eu/pubdocs/2001/21/en/1/ef0121en.pdf> 
Table 4 Economic sectors (NACE main sections) by education
1995 Rank 1995 2005 Rank 2005
Financial Intermediation [H] 34.6 4 56.0 1
Other Services [H] 42.2 3 56.0 1
Real Estate and Business Activities [H] 42.3 2 54.8 3
Public Administration [-] 44.1 1 45.6 4
Electricity, Gas and Water Supply [I] 29.0 5 34.9 5
Transportation and Communication [I] 24.6 7 28.7 6
Mining and Quarrying, Manufacturing [I] 25.1 6 26.5 7
Wholesale and Retail Trade, Repairs [L] 19.0 9 24.3 8
Construction [L] 22.2 8 20.8 9
Hotels and Restaurants [L] 15.4 10 18.1 10
Agriculture, Hunting, Forestry, Fishing [L] 14.1 11 14.6 11
The letter in brackets indicates a sector’s “knowledge intensity category,” explained in the text. 
Source: EWCS (1995; higher education indicated by percentage of respondents who finished education at 
age 20+) and EWCS (2005; higher education indicated by percentage of respondents with ISCED-score 4 or 
higher). 
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Ignoring the 2000 survey, we find that management control in high knowledge intensity 
sectors has increased between 1995 and 2005, for knowledge workers as well as for oth-
er workers. In the intermediate knowledge intensity sectors, management control was 
fairly stable; it also increased in the low knowledge intensity sectors, but there only for 
knowledge workers. Part of an explanation can be found in the high level of manage-
ment control in the intermediate knowledge intensity sectors in 1995, where the high 
level presumably relates to the fact that respondents from the “intermediate” category 
were working in medium-sized and large companies relatively often. It is quite likely 
that larger companies were ahead of smaller companies in “rationalizing” work. 
Comparing the columns in Table 5, we find that fewer knowledge workers mention a 
high degree of management control than do other workers, but the difference becomes 
smaller between 1995 and 2005, mainly because knowledge workers catch up: the per-
centage of knowledge workers mentioning a high level of control increased more rap-
idly than among other workers.
Discussion and conclusion
“Knowledge work” is an elusive concept. It can be used to refer to everything from the 
kind of work people do, the kind of company they work for, or even the kind of industry 
in which they are employed, to a person’s occupation, their educational background, or 
the professional group to which they belong. In this paper we chose an approach that 
avoids such a priori classifications of knowledge work. Characteristic of labor processes 
in the “knowledge society,” we argued, is that work is increasingly organized according 
Table 5 Percentage of respondents scoring high on the management control variable
Knowledge work
(high autonomy,  
many external contacts)
Other work
(low autonomy and/or few  
external contacts)
Knowledge 
intensity of sector
High
1995: 35.7
2000: 30.6
2005: 44.3
1995: 48.3
2000: 40.4
2005: 52.7
Intermediate
1995: 47.5
2000; 30.6
2005: 44.7
1995: 70.6
2000: 64.7
2005: 69.2
Low
1995: 39.1
2000: 36.6
2005: 47.7
1995: 58.8
2000: 51.0
2005: 58.1
Based on q21c, “numerical production targets or performance targets,” and on q21e, “the pace of work 
depends on direct control of your boss.”
Source: EWCS (1995, 2000, 2005).
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to standards from the consulting field – which is notable because “consultants not only 
exemplify the category of the highly-skilled knowledge worker; they also play a key 
role in the knowledge economy and are considered to be representative of the organi-
zational arrangements that are emerging with the rise of a knowledge-based economy” 
(Donnelly 2004: 79). A high degree of work autonomy and many external contacts are 
typical of consulting (and of other occupations often associated with knowledge work). 
Using these two features to operationalize knowledge work, we were able to analyze 
developments in the proportion of knowledge work and the nature of knowledge work 
without having to resort to some known category of knowledge workers, whether this 
were based on education, occupation, industry, or any other of the definitions that are 
commonly used. The reason for not relying on any of these known categories is not that 
available definitions of knowledge work, and of knowledge workers, are unacceptable 
(though many are ambiguous, as argued). The point is rather that these definitions – 
all involving knowledge-related phenomena deemed crucial by those who submitted 
the definition – cannot be used for studying the development towards a knowledge 
economy: conclusions would be tautological. There is no need to prove that the number 
of workplaces occupied by persons with higher education has increased; that is a fact. 
Instead, we are interested in the characteristics of work in these workplaces and argue 
that increasing levels of education are not necessarily tied to the increasing profession-
alization of work. We add that the operationalization of knowledge work we propose 
may serve the study of changes in the nature of work within any of the known catego-
ries, in a way that does not require one to address the awkward question of whether 
profession X or industry Y is now using more knowledge than some decades ago. These 
are advantages.
There are disadvantages as well. A drawback of our approach is that the category of 
knowledge work will include respondents who do have autonomy and external contacts, 
but whose work still does not seem to qualify them as “genuine” knowledge workers – 
because their education level does not allow for it. We acknowledge that most, if not all, 
discussions of knowledge work take a higher education level for granted. In this sense, 
our approach may seem to run counter to established views of knowledge work. We 
still think there are good arguments for the view that workers who have autonomy and 
external contacts are representative of a knowledge economy, even if they are less edu-
cated.  Clearly, there is a heterogeneous collection of trades, crafts, and even healthcare 
occupations that combine high autonomy and frequent external contacts with little 
or no formal education: barbers, knife-grinders, chimney sweepers, ice-cream vendors, 
taxi drivers. Interestingly, in the past, most people involved in such occupations were 
self-employed. Today, many of them are employed by others, and consequently their 
autonomy will often be limited. If such less-educated workers today indicate they have 
high autonomy and many external contacts, they are just as representative of trends 
in a knowledge economy as workers with more education – but their numbers will be 
small.
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Another drawback is that some people who are usually considered knowledge workers 
(and who would consider themselves to be so) fall outside our definition, as they have 
limited or no contact with persons outside the company they work for. While this is 
a drawback, we don’t consider it serious enough to drop “frequent external contacts” 
as a criterion. In a time when competitive performance is generally seen to depend 
on external networking, supply chain management, collaboration, alliances, customer 
orientation, and open innovation, all of which are often considered defining charac-
teristics of the knowledge economy, it can be argued that “real” knowledge work will 
always involve frequent contacts with persons outside the company, be they suppliers or 
customers, competitors or university professors. 
It should be noted that our data is based on a survey asking respondents about their 
views. Especially in cases of autonomy and management control, these views may not 
only differ from the estimations of neutral outside observers, they may also change in-
dependently of the real situation. It is for instance possible that in a situation in which 
real autonomy has actually increased, the percentage of respondents indicating high 
autonomy will be decreasing, because the greater autonomy has only stimulated work-
ers’ desire for even more autonomy. Bateson (1972) called this phenomenon “comple-
mentary escalation”: capitulation increases demands (see also Omer 2001). In future 
research, respondents’ perceptions of their autonomy will have to be compared with 
views concerning phenomena less likely to be subject to complementary escalation.
Despite these (possible) drawbacks, our analysis clearly demonstrates that a major claim 
of the new work paradigm – that it is a matter of time before all jobs meet the profes-
sional service model – is questionable. And if there is reason for doubt, adherence to the 
new paradigm can be harmful. At the firm level, this adherence may prevent efforts to 
create forms of work organization in which “old” and “new” work (and “old” and “new” 
workers) are brought together in ways that avoid a two-tiered work organization. Such 
a two-tier organization may worsen the working conditions of less-educated workers; 
it may lead to “erosion of internal labor markets” (Burris 1998), and to a “redefinition 
of what constitutes legitimate work knowledge,” to the “standardization of decisions 
made by non-expert workers,” and ultimately engender workplace tensions and loss 
of organizational flexibility (Vallas/Beck 1996). At the state level, this adherence may 
strengthen the unfortunate belief that traditional work is ceasing to be important and 
that it is not necessary to make serious investments in it.
There are scientific implications as well. We found that the share of knowledge work, as 
indicated by autonomy and external contacts, is not growing; it is stable at best. Rather 
than taking this as an argument to reduce research on knowledge work (and knowledge 
workers), we suggest that the reasons for this stagnation be studied carefully. Subjects 
that may be examined in detail are (1) the processes contributing to the coming of a 
knowledge economy, along with counteracting tendencies, (2) knowledge heterogene-
ity within and between “groups” under conditions of an emerging knowledge economy, 
and (3) the role of “exogenous” processes and events. 
26 MPIfG Working Paper 09/16
In an earlier section, we described four trends that contributed to (the coming of) 1. 
the knowledge economy and to the knowledge work paradigm: the rising level of 
education, the growth of services, automation and ICT, and the relocation of work. 
Each of these trends involves a large and complex collection of contributing pro-
cesses that needs further exploration. It is possible, moreover, that further trends 
will need to be added. Scarbrough (1999), for instance, notes that the institutional 
setting for knowledge work is shifting away from professions or disciplines towards 
organizationally-defined contexts of use. This, he argues, is the result of four related 
developments: the relative decline of the professional model, the increasing impor-
tance of knowledge work in a range of occupational groups, the codification and 
commodification of knowledge through new ICTs, and the emergence of new sectors 
of knowledge production within the economy. What is needed, then, is a thorough 
analysis of trends and processes contributing to the knowledge economy, including 
an assessment of the importance of each of these, and an analysis of the factors that 
are hampering or slowing down the development of a knowledge economy. 
As we have shown (Tables 4 and 5), sectors differ in terms of knowledge intensity. It 2. 
is likely that such differences will be found at other levels of aggregation as well: work 
functions, firms, regions, countries. Not only is it important to examine the degree 
of knowledge heterogeneity at each level and analyze the reasons, but it is also im-
portant to study the implications, e.g. to investigate whether, and how, high and low 
knowledge-intensity firms are able to collaborate, or how working relations between 
well-educated and less-educated workers evolve (Burrell 1998).
Finally, the role of exogenous processes and events may have to be considered. Of the 3. 
three surveys used in this study, two were administered at a peculiar point in time. 
Data in the 2000 survey was collected in the days of the dot-com crash. The 2005 
survey was administered at the moment when European economies were just reco-
vering from the recession that followed the dot-com crash. The next EWCS survey 
is due to follow in 2010, and responses will be influenced by the present economic 
circumstances. These days, it seems, there are not many “ordinary years” in which to 
conduct a survey on European working conditions, and this applies to knowledge 
economy-related trends and processes as well. Economic crisis is not the only factor 
that can change the course of “normal” trends and processes in the economy in an 
unpredictable way (political crisis is another good candidate), but it is probably the 
most important one. Rethinking its impact on short- and longer-term economic 
development, and its impact on available data concerning economic development, 
would be well-advised. 
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